Phase II Intelligence Report as told by Loud Crickets

I just read the media reports of the Phase II Senate Intel Report. No Saddam/Al Queda links? Saddam thought AQ was a threat? That's not why my mama taught me.

Actually, I think the Senate and the media has done a HORRIBLE job at interpreting intel, and has done so for political purposes. So I am releasing this "Loud Crickets" version of the Phase II Intel Report.

I decided to do some research, both into the ACTUAL SENATE REPORT (not the media version), as well as the documents regarding Iraq.

If you recall, the justification for war in Iraq was a "conjunction of WMD and terrorism" (as we found out from the Downing St. memos).

Let's see where we are at in 2006...

WMD

Let's start with WMD, the biggie. The Iraq Survey Group released its report on Iraqi WMD programs in Sept., 2004. Much of the information about Iraqi WMD is from the ISG report; in fact, the Senate Report, on page 11, states that: "The Committee used the ISG's report and information gathered from theISG team as the primary evidentiary basis".

What did the ISG say in 2004? That Saddam basically gave up his WMD program in 1991, and there were no WMD stockpiles.

We already knew this, and it represents an absolute colossal failure in intelligence.

However...

The ISG said something even MORE important:

"(U) Based on its postwar debriefings of Saddam Hussein, debriefings ofother key figures in the Iraqi regime, and document exploitation, the ISGconcluded that Saddam's primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to end sanctions,while preserving the capability to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction whenthat occurred."

Read that again. Go ahead, I'll wait...

Yes, he was going to rebuild WMD stockpiles when sanctions ended (which he thought was imminent). Saddam was bribing French and Russian government officials (according to the ISG), and after sanctions were lifted, Saddam would have REBUILT HIS WMD STOCKPILES.

Some more quotes from the ISG/Phase II Senate Report:
page 123 of the Phase II Senate Report:

"(U) Initially, according to the ISG, Saddam was confident in Iraq's ability to ride out inspections without fully cooperating. Therefore, Iraq declared only part of its ballistic missile and chemical warfare programs, but not its nuclear weapons and biological warfare programs.304"

page 125 of the Phase II Senate Report:

"(U) Saddam viewed nuclear programs as a symbol of a modern nation, indicative of technological, scientific, and economic progress. Saddam was unconvinced by the notion of nonproliferation, believing that nuclear weapons provided "strategic balance."315 He wanted them "to compete with powerful and antagonistic neighbors; to him, nuclear weapons were necessary for Iraq to survive."316 He "considered WMD as the only sure counterbalance to an enemy developing WMD of its own."

(U) The ISG also found that Saddam probably intended to have a different mix of WMD capabilities after sanctions ended: "Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability - in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks - but he intended to focus on ballistic missiles and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.""' According to the ISG, events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam's views about the kind of WMD capability Iraq needed, believing that chemical weapons and ballistic missiles had saved the regime several times.312 In particular, Saddam concluded that Iraq's use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war prevented Iran from completely overrunning outnumbered Iraqi forces."

The ISG is VERY CLEAR, and this Senate Report is also very clear: Saddam thought WMD were useful, even NECESSARY, against Iran, and has SAVED his regime in the Iran/Iraq War. Saddam intended to ride out inspections, keep scientists and data on WMD, and then REBUILD after sanctions were ended.

So, yes, Saddam did NOT have WMD. But he did have the INTENSE DESIRE to rebuild WMD stockpiles, the MEANS (he had already done it before), and would have had the OPPORTUNITY after sanctions were inevitably lifted.

This is, to say the least, kind of important. If we left Saddam in power, and sanctions were lifted, then, according to the ISG this Senate Report, Saddam would have REBUILT HIS WMD STOCKPILES.

OK, that is not only in the ISG, but is quoted in the Phase II Senate Report on page 122. Let's go into the Phase II report on ACTIVE WMD capabilities.

Nuclear:

Aluminum tubes. What were they used for rockets or for a nuclear centrifuge? The Senate makes their own judgement on page 21: "the Committee believed the information available to the Intelligence Community indicated that the tubes were intended for a conventional rocket program and not a nuclear program."

Well, let's see on one hand, we have the director of Iraqi centrifuge program saying the tubes couldn't be used for a centrifuge. But is he believable? Probably not, as all high-ranking Iraqi officials have a strong reason to lie to the US debriefers.

We have this statement, p.22: "One version of the assessment, published as a Senior ExecutiveMemorandum, included a check list which showed that of eight categoriesidentified the tubes were suitable for a centrifuge end use in all eight, but weresuitable for rockets in only two.38"

Well, you tell me: why would Iraq build/buy aluminum tubes that matched 8/8 categories for use in a centrifuge, yet only 2/8 for rockets, and then claim they were for rockets? How is this explained in the Senate Report? It's not.

And we had Saddam's intent, p.25 of the report : "Several senior Iraqis told the ISG they assumed Saddam would reconstitute Iraq's nuclear program once sanctions were lifted.4"
Still think the aluminum tubes were for rockets?

Iraqi uranium purchases

This is muddy waters, which has been made even MORE muddy by the forged documents. If you recall, Bush made a speech saying that the the British have determined that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Africa.

Well, that's true. The Brits DID maintain that, and DO TODAY. They released a report on Iraqi intel known as the UK Bulter Commission Report, released July 2004.

In it, it states, page 139:

"503. From our examination of the intelligence and other material on Iraqiattempts to buy uranium from Africa, we have concluded that:a. It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in1999.b. The British Government had intelligence from several differentsources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiringuranium. Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters ofNiger’s exports, the intelligence was credible.c. The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, asopposed to having sought, uranium and the British Governmentdid not claim this.d. The forged documents were not available to the BritishGovernment at the time its assessment was made, and so the factof the forgery does not undermine it."

Basically:

UK is saying Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger in 1999UK said Iraq was trying to buy uranium BEFORE the forged memos came outUK STILL MAINTAINS Iraq tried to buy uranium (as of July 2004)UK had intel from SEVERAL DIFFERENT SOURCES that Iraq tried to buy uranium from NigerUK is NOT SURE if the sale went through.

The evidence in the Senate report is contradictory: In Oct 2002, DCI Tenet asked Bush remove the uranium/Africa section from his speech, however: on p.17 of the Senate Report: "Also in October, the CIA published an Iraq handbook which said, "Iraqmay be trying to acquire 500 tons of uranium - enough for 50 nuclear devices afterprocessing - from Niger. "2"

And also, in mid-November 2002: "the U.S. government briefed the IAEA's Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO) that"reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from Africa are fragmentary, atbest. We assess that none of these deals have gone through, but it shows that Iraqis probably trying to acquire uranium ore abroad."26"

"On February 4,2003, the U.S. government provided copies of the Nigeruranium documents to the IAEA with talking points which stated, "two streams ofreporting suggest Iraq has attempted to acquire uranium from Niger. We cannotconfirm these reports and have questions regarding some specific claims.Nonetheless, we are concerned that these reports may indicate Baghdad hasattempted to secure an unreported source of uranium yellowcake for a nuclearweapons program." The two streams of reporting mentioned refer to theintelligence reports from the foreign intelligence service and a CIA intelligencereport reflecting the findings of a former Ambassador's visit to Niger ."

"On February 27,2003, the CIA responded to a January 29,2003 letterfrom Senator Carl Levin which asked the CIA to detail "what the U.S. IC knowsabout Saddam Hussein seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa."The CIA's response was almost identical to the points passed to the IAEA in earlyFebruary, saying "two streams of reporting suggest Iraq had attempted to acquireuranium from Niger." The response said the CIA believes the government ofNiger's assurances that it did not contract with Iraq but said, "nonetheless, wequestion, based on a second source, whether Baghdad may have been probingNiger for access to yellowcake in the 1999 time frame.""

In contrast, the UK, in 2004, TWO YEARS after the CIA waffled on Iraq/Niger, the UK Butler Report said unequivocally that Iraq did in fact attempt to buy uranium from Niger.

And so, in the Phase II Report, CIA as of 2003 did have some doubts, but DID believe Iraq tried to buy uranium, UK still maintains that. Yet in their conclusions, the Senate Report states on p.28 :"The head of Iraq's pre- 199 1 nuclear weapons program, Ja'far Diya' Ja'far, stated that after 1998, Iraq had two contacts with Niger and neither wasregarding uranium. In 1999, Iraq's Ambassador to the Holy See, WissamZahawie, traveled to Niger to invite the President of Niger to visit Iraq and, in200 1, a Nigerien minister visited Iraq to discuss purchasing petroleum."

Completely IGNORING the UK's CURRENT stance that Iraq tried to buy Niger uranium in 1999, as well as the stance of the CIA which is "whether Baghdad may have been probing Niger for access to yellowcake in the 1999 time frame."

UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle)

Senate Report concludes: "that Iraq's UAVs were primarily intended for reconnaissance."
OK.

Couple of problems with that:

p.62 "The ISG found that, in the early 1990s, Iraq attempted to develop a CBW delivery systemfor a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV)"

p.54:"One Iraqi engineer without direct access to the information, said that in 1995, many Iraqi Air Force engineers believed the intended use was to attack a US aircraft carrier with chemical or biological weapons."Now why would this guy lie? He's just an engieneer, nothing to gain or lose. And he's talking w/other engineers who say it was to "attack a US aircraft carrier with chemical or biological weapons."

Certainly not definitive, but definitely not something to IGNORE, which the Senate did.

Biological Weapons (BW):
It was clear 2 years ago from the ISG that Saddam didn't have active BW stockpiles. This is consistent w/Saddam trying to end sanctions/inspections so he could rebuild stockpiles. Here is some interesting evidence COMPLETELY OVERLOOKED by the Senate Report and the media:

p.36:"According to the ISG, Iraq actively pursued the goal of drying its BW agent and possessed the expertiseand equipment to do so"Why would Iraq want to dry BW agent? Maybe to preserve it until sanctions ended?

"Iraq retained some BW-related seed stock until their discovery after Operation IraqiFreedom (OIF). 83"Why would Saddam want to retain BW-related seed stock? Maybe to preserve it until sanctions ended?

p. 35:"(U) The ISG found undeclared covert laboratories used by the IraqiIntelligence Service (IIS) until the mid-1990s for research into BW agents."How come I haven't heard about THAT in the media?

p.35"The ISG judged that actions between 1991 and 1996 demonstrated Iraq's intention to preserve its BW capability and progress to a mature BW program when and if the opportunity arose."

Seems pretty clear cut right there.

Chemical:

Again, no caches of chemical weapons as intel had indicated. Huge, tragic, failure in intelligence. But as we read on p.44:

"The ISG found no credible evidenceindicating Iraq resumed its chemical weapons program after 1991, but said that"Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctionswere lifted and conditions were judged favorable.""Seems pretty clear cut right there.
And Saddam actively tried to hide the fact that he kept data and scientists regarding WMD around.

Read this document just released from Iraq:http://abcnews.go.com/International/IraqCoverage/story?id=1734490&page=2

"Hiding Docs from the U.N. Team"
Document dated March 23, 1997
"A letter from the Iraqi intelligence service to directors and managers advising them to follow certain procedures in case of a search by the U.N. team, including:

"Removing correspondence with the atomic energy and military industry departments concerning the prohibited weapons (proposals, research, studies, catalogs, etc.) Removing prohibited materials and equipment, including documents and catalogs and making sure to clear labs and storages of any traces of chemical or biological materials that were previously used or stored Doing so through a committee which will decide whether to destroy the documents Removing files from computers. "

Letter was dated 1997.

Again, it shows that according to the ISG and THIS Senate Report (and the Loud Crickets version), Saddam could have and WOULD HAVE rebuilt his bio, chem, and possibly nuke WMDs after sanctions were lifted.

So let's think what would have happened if we did NOT invade? Sanctions AT SOME POINT would have been lifted; this was "imminent", according to the ISG. We all know about the bribery regarding the UN oil-for-food, but do you know about this:http://abcnews.go.com/International/IraqCoverage/story?id=1734490&page=1"Election Campaign Laws in France"

"Documents dated July-August 1999
Correspondence regarding election campaigns in France. This includes a document from the Iraqi intelligence service classified as "secret," ordering the translation of important parts of a 1997 report about campaign financing laws in France. It also includes a document from the foreign minister's office indicating the report was attached. The attached translated report included very detailed information about all the regulations regarding financing of election campaigns in France."

Um, why would Saddam want to know about campaign finance laws in France? That doesn't ring any bells out there?

Point is, sanctions would have been lifted eventually, leaving Saddam free to develop WMD. To recap:

Did Saddam find WMD offensive? No, he thought them NECESSARY and VALUABLE.

Did he use them before? Yes.

Did he still feel threatened by Iran? Yes.

Did he have expertise and equipment to build them? Yes.

Did he try to hide that from UN? Yes.

Was he bribing France/Russia, and thought sanctions would end soon? Yes.

According to the ISG/Senate Report, would Saddam have rebuilt WMD after sanctions were lifted: YES.

Let's move on to Iraq/Al Queda links. Much hay has been made in the media that there are "no Saddam/Al Queda links", according to the Senate Report. But is that the case?

Well, we could ask Saddam:

p.70 "Saddam then specified that Iraq did not cooperate with bin Ladin."

OK.

We could ask Tariq Aziz: "According to Tariq Aziz, "Saddam only expressed negative sentimentsabout bin Ladin.""

OK.

We could ask al-Tikriti, a top Iraqi official: "al-Tikriti noted that Saddam Hussein'sposition was that Iraq should not deal with al-Qa'ida."

OK.

Well, I guess that's that. I mean, if Saddam, Aziz, and al-Tikriti say there were no ties between Iraq/AQ, I guess they must be telling the truth.

Is the Senate nuts??!?!?

Why would you listen to Saddam or any of his top officials on the matter? First, if collaboration between Saddam/AQ were proven, he would have a great chance of being EXECUTED. Second, he ABSOLUTELY wants to damage the credibility of Bush, the man who put him in jail and DEPOSED HIM. If he can weaken Bush, the chance that he won't be executed DECREASES. Even if he still were to be executed, Saddam would want to weaken Bush PURELY OUT OF SPITE.

So there is obviously a VERY HIGH INCENTIVE for Saddam AND ALL OF HIS OFFICIALS to lie about their AQ involvement.

Instead of asking them, let's look at the actual EVIDENCE.

Let's start out with page 73:

"We have reporting from reliable clandestine and press sources that atleast eight direct meetings between senior Iraqi representatives andtop al-Qa'ida operatives took place from the early 1990s to thepresent. Several dozen additional direct or indirect such meetings areattested to by less reliable clandestine and press sources during thesame period.1"

So the CIA CONFIRMED 8 meetings, and most likely MANY MORE occurred, given that it is illogical to think that 100% of the "less reliable clandestine and press sources" are false, and there were "several dozen" of those.

So, they met multiple times; in Iraq, in Sudan, and Afghanistan. But why? Why would Saddam want to visit his enemy?

AQ officials visited Baghdad, as LATE AS 1998:

p.77 "(U) In May 2004, a review of previously unpublished intelligence from AbuHafs al-Mauritani's travels indicated, according to one intelligence agency, that "itappears likely, in retrospect, that senior al-Qa'ida official, Abu-Hafs, theMauritanian, visited Iraq at least once in June of 1998. He possibly also visitedIraq in March 1998, but this is less certain and based solely on circumstantialevidence. "

"(U) Postwar information from the former Iraqi Ambassador to Sudan, AbdulSamad Hamid al-Qaisi, also supports the claim of Abu Hafs' visit to Baghdad. Avariety of reporting corroborates Abu-Hafs visit in March 1998, while only onesource suggests a visit in June 1998."

It appears he visited in March AND June, 1998. But why? Why would a SENIOR al Queda official want to visit Baghdad? I thought AQ thought Saddam as an enemy?

Here's the real kicker, VIRTUALLY IGNORED by the Senate Report, on page 76:

"(U) A captured document states that bin Ladin asked Hijazi in the 1995meeting to dedicate targeted broadcasting of sermons by Shaikh Sulayman al-Udah and to conduct joint operations against foreign forces in Saudi Arabia."
"The document describes Iraqi Intelligence Servicecontacts with Saudi oppositionists, including bin Ladin. The document does notindicate that Saddam agreed to joint operations with bin Ladin, but notes thatSaddam "agreed to dedicate programs for targeted broadcasting." The documentalso states that "through dialogue and agreements we will leave the door open tofurther develop the relationship and cooperation between both sides. '3 192"

"further develop the relationship and cooperation between both sides"

"further develop the relationship and cooperation between both sides"

"further develop the relationship and cooperation between both sides"

Does that sound like Saddam considers AQ as an ENEMY? That they had "no ties"? Yet that is what the media is reporting.

Salman Pak

Salman Pak was, according to p. 85: "The Salman Pak Unconventional Warfare Training Facility wasestablished in the late 1970's. Iraqi officials told UNSCOM inspectors that acounterterrorist unit was established at Salman Pak in 1985. Iraqi officialsreiterated the claims and indicated that the IIS established the facility to traincounterterror units."

What does the Senate Report say about AQ and Salman Pak?"Reporting about al-Qa'ida activity at Salman Pak-ultimately sourcedto three Iraqi defectors-surged after 11 September. The defectorsclaimed that al-Qa'ida and other non-Iraqis engaged in specialoperations training at Salman Pak. It was subsequently determined,however, that at least one of these defectors, whose story appeared inmagazine,had embellished and exaggerated his access. Others repeated similar information but apparently did not have first-hand access to it. No al-Qa'ida associates detained since 11 September have said they trained at Salman Pak."

"In an October 2002 assessment, the DIA said, "there have been fragmentary reports that Iraq hasmore recently trained foreign Islamic extremists in terrorist tactics and techniquesat this facility, but this has not been definitively e~tablished."~A~ N' ovember 2002Special Analysis said "while there has been some recent unconventional trainingactivity detected at Salman Pak in early-September, it is unclear whether al-Qa'idaor other Islamic extremists have been involved in these activities."222"

OK, that doesn't say much. There WERE people that say AQ was trained at Salman Pak, it's just that the CIA can't CONFIRM their statements.

"There was information developed after OIF that indicated terroristswere trained at Salman Pak; there was an apparent surge of suchreporting. As with past information, however, the reporting is vagueand difficult to substantiate."

Again, in June 2006, CIA says there was information that AQ WERE trained at Salman Pak, but they can't substantiate it.

page 88:"A November 2003 assessment from DIA noted that postwar exploitationof the facility found it "devoid of valuable intelligence." The assessment addedthat CIA exploitation "found nothing of intelligence value remained and assessedthe Iraqi Intelligence Service (11s) cleaned it out." The DIA assessment concludedthat "we do not know whether the ex-regime trained terrorists on the aircraft atSalman Pak. Intelligence in late April 2003 indicated the plane had beendismantled. DIA and CENTCOM assess the plane was sold for scrap."227"

OK, here's my question: WHY would the IIS (Iraqi Intelligence) "clean out" Salman Pak? I mean, Iraq PUBLICLY announced Salman Pak in 1985 as a counterterrorism training ground. So ostensibly, if all it was used for was counterterrorism, IIS would have ABSOLUTELY NO REASON so "clean it out".

Yet, they DID clean it out.

And here's another one, page 88:

"(U) The Iraq Survey Group found that an Iraqi intelligence directorate, M14,which was responsible for training and special operations missions, used theSalman Pak facility to train Iraqis, Palestinians, Syrians, Yemeni, Lebanese,Egyptian, and Sudanese operatives in counterterrorism, explosives, marksmanship,and foreign operations.228"

Uh, train them in "foreign operations"? Hmmm. Iraq has an order to train FOREIGNERS in explosives and "foreign operations". Why would Iraq want to train foreign nationals (Sudanese, Yemeni, etc.) to conduct "foreign operations" that would require the use of explosives? Multiple reports that AQ was trained at Salman Pak. IIS clears out Salman Pak before Americans arrived.

And what does the Senate conclude on this? Nothing.

Iraq training Al Queda on bio/chem weapons

This subject is obviously of PRIMARY importance. If Iraq trained AQ on bio/chem weapons, not only would it show collaboration on attacks, but also that Saddam intended to DELIVER WMD to AQ after sanctions ended. So what do we know on the subject?

p. 79:"(U) The CIA relied heavily on the information obtained from the debriefing ofdetainee Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, a senior al-Qa'ida operational planner, to assessIraq's potential CBW training of al-Qa'ida. The January 2003 paper, IraqiSupport for Terrorism, reported that al-Libi told a foreign intelligence service:Iraq-acting on the request of al-Qa'ida militant Abu Abdullah, whowas Muhammad Atif's emissary-agreed to provide unspecifiedchemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qa'ida associatesbeginning in December 2000. The two individuals departed for Iraqbut did not return, so al-Libi was not in a position to know if anytraining had taken place. 19s"

Wow. Iraq agreed to train 2 AQ members in chemical/biological weapons.

The DIA was wary of this:p.80:"Saddam's regime is intensely secular and is waryof Islamic revolutionary movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikelyto provide assistance to a group it cannot control.20'"

Here's the problem:

p.82 "In January 2004, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, the source of reports onal-Qa'ida's efforts to obtain CBW training in Iraq, recanted the information heprovided. Al-Libi said he had a "strong desire to tell his entire story and identifywhy and how he fabricated information since his capture."20"

Darn it! He recanted; he made up everything, I guess Iraq never trained AQ on chem/bio weapons.

One question: why did al-Libi recant?

al Libi is a senior AQ member, why would he care to recant the training of AQ agents by Iraq a year later?

Would he get a lesser sentence or get out of jail because he recanted: NO.

Would any of his friends get out of jail/lesser sentence because he recanted: NO.

Would Saddam or anyone in Iraq go free because he recanted: NO.

Would there by ANY effect, except to weaken Bush's case for war in Iraq, thereby embarrassing US in the ME: NO.

All his recantation does, in practical terms, is remove linkage between AQ/Iraq. Why would an AQ official "care" about Saddam, why would he even bother to recant? I thought Saddam/AQ were enemies; if that was the case, al-Libi would DEFINITELY NOT RECANT.

But again, all the recantation DOES is EMBARASS the US, make the US intel agencies LOOK BAD, and DECREASE the chances the US military will be involved in the Middle East. Would al-Libi want that? ABSOLUTELY.

So given al-Libi's MOTIVE for recanting, I think the recantation is HIGHLY SUSPECT, to say the least. After all, what would MOTIVATE al-Libi for recanting?

Safehaven for AQ:

The Senate Report paints a picture that Saddam did NOT provide safehaven for AQ members. In fact, testimony FROM IRAQI OFFICIALS is given in testimony and media reports that Al Zarqawi was an "outlaw". Suuuuuuuure.

Again, we have EVIDENCE that suggests otherwise. One instance was the murder of US diplomat Lawrence Foley. According to documents, IIS set up a "special committee" to track down al-Zarqawi, but was unable tolocate and capture him. (p.93)

There were 5 individuals wanted for the Foley murder. "In early 2003, the IISsuccessfully arrested one of the individuals, Abu Yasim Sayyem." (p.94)

OK, Iraq is tracking down AQ killers? Where are you going w/this, Loud Crickets?

Where am I going? HERE:

p.94"(U) Although Sayyem denied any affiliation with al-Qa'ida or Zarqawi, theIIS officer believed the evidence of criminal activity provided by the foreignintelligence service against Sayyem was compelling. For this reason, the IISofficer was shocked when the Director of his division ordered Sayyem to bereleased. According to the Iraqi official, the Director of his division told him thatSaddam Hussein ordered Sayyem's release.246"

Why, oh why, would Saddam release Foley's killer, an AQ associate?

Well, we have the word of an IIS officer to go with:p.95 "(U) According to the CIA, a former IIS officer believed that Saddamreleased Sayyem because he "would participate in striking U.S. forces when theyentered Iraq."249"

Now why would Saddam think that? I mean, if AQ REALLY was a threat/enemy, why would he release him? Wouldn't Saddam be worried that AQ would work WITH the Americans to depose HIM, their "enemy"? I mean, if AQ was such a threat, then releasing him when he would be weakened by invasion seems a bit ridiculous. Yet he seemed NOT TO BE WORRIED that Sayyem would turn around and attack him. In fact, according to a former IIS officer, Saddam thought Sayyem would attack US forces. Seems a pretty big gamble from a group that Saddam considered a "threat" and an "enemy", who was the COMPATRIOT of al Zarqawi and WANTED for the MURDER of a US Diplomat.

Ansar al Islam/al Zarqawi

Senate Report suggets that the al Zarqawi link was overblown. But apart from the senction above, where Saddam RELEASED a captured AQ member, Abu Yasim Sayyem, who was affiliated w/Al Zarqawi, there is other EVIDENCE apart from relying on the testimony of Iraqi officials who, again, HAVE EVERY REASON TO LIE TO US OFFICIALS.

p.95:"In addition, "detainees that originallyreported on AI-IIS links have recanted, and another detainee, in September 2003,was deemed to have insufficient access and level of detail to substantiate hisclaims.252"AI being Ansr-Al-Islam, IIS being Iraqi Security. Again a recantation that AQ and Iraq were linked. Amazing how many recantations there are, isn't it? :) And again, what purpose does it serve them to recant?

p.96"The DIA said that one detainee speculated that al-Zarqawi may have had contacts with the former regime prior to Operation IraqiFreedom, but all other detainees' information, from both the former regime andmembers of al-Zaqawi's network, denied such contacts occurred.253"
So we should discount that one detainee? Why?

p.74"The DIA said that al-Qa'ida "has proven ties to Ansar al-Islam""

p.74:"Should regime support to Ansar al-Islam be proven, this will notnecessarily implicate the regime in supporting al-Qa'ida. Ansar al-Islam is an independent organization that receives assistance from al-Qa'ida, but is not a branch of the group. The Iraqi regime seeks toinfluence and manipulate political events in the Kurdish-controllednorth and probably has some type of assets in contact with Ansar al-Islam, either through liaison or through penetration by an intelligence asset. 86"

So AI had PROVEN ties to AQ, and Iraq "has some type of assets in contact with Ansar al-Islam."

Saddam wanted to aid AI, because AI was undermining the Kurdish area that he did not control. AQ was helping to do that with support, and al Zarqawi was a terrorist leader in this area. The link is AT LEAST circumstantial:

Saddam releases al Zarqawi's murder accomplices

Saddam has an interest in AI/al Zarqawi because they are fighting his enemy, the Kurds

Al Zarqawi went to Baghdad in 2002 in May for "possibly seeking medical treatment for war injuries" (p.90)

And also: "The assessment said that the regime was aware of al-Zarqawi's presence, at a minimum, because aforeign government service gave Baghdad identifying information.")"

If Saddam was keen on capturing al Zarqwai, if he was an "outlaw", why release his accomplice, Sayyem? Seems like Saddam would have tortured Sayyem to get al Zarqawi's whereabout instead of RELEASING HIM.

p. 92"A detainee with knowledge of the operation indicated that al-Zarqawi directed and financed the assassination cell, "before, during, and after al-Zarqawi spent several months in Baghdad."242"

p.112"Postwar findings indicate al-Zarqawi was in Baghdad from May 2002 until late November2002, when he traveled to Iran and northeastern Iraq."
According to the CIA, IIS knew about this, since "The assessment said that the regime was aware of al-Zarqawi's presence, at a minimum, because a foreign government service gave Baghdad identifying information.")"

So he's in Iraq, ostensibly injured, an "outlaw", according to Iraqi officials. They were really looking for him and couldn't find him.

How is that possible? If the guy is injured, where is he going to be treated, Al Queda Medical Center? A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SERVICE gave IIS info that Al Zarqawi was coming to Iraq, he was INJURED, and was there for MONTHS, all while they are looking for him?
And then, when they actually CAPTURE one of Al Zarqawi's accomplices, Sayyem, SADDAM LETS HIM GO.

Yet this is brushed over in the Senate Report, and the Senate believes Iraq that they "didn't know where Al Zarqawi was". Suuuuuuure.

Planning on Sepmtember 11 Attacks

Much has been made of Mohammed Atta, a 9/11 hijacker, meeting with the IIS Chief in Prague prior to 9/11. Proving this link would be extremely damning.

In this report, the Senators basically doubt the idea a meeting took place, based partly on the IIS official's testimony (there they go, relying on the word of Iraqi officials).

Here's what he said:p.103"Very surprised to hear that a 9/11 hijacker was associated with travelto Czech Republic."

You know what? Me too. WHY was Atta in Prague to begin with?

p.98:"The CIA could confirm only two of the visits-in December 1994 and June2000-but neither of the trips matched the date of the meeting between al-Ani andAtta alleged by the Czechs."

So, the CIA CONFIRMED Atta went to Prague in 2000. But why? Vacation? Nice weather? Girlfriend? That alone is suspicious.

But the it was reported by an "asset" of the Czech secret service that Atta met the IIS Prague Chief. So, why would that guy lie? I mean, let's say the gyu made it up. Isn't that REALLY COINCIDENTAL that Atta DID ACTUALLY GO TO PRAGUE? How would that guy know that he did visit Prague, as confirmed by the CIA in 1994 and 2000?

Think about it: this guy sees a picture of Atta, and then tells the Czech Secret Service he saw Atta meet the Iraqi IIS Chief, even though IT WAS NOT BROADCAST that Atta was ever in Prague? That is REALLY, REALLY, REALLY lucky that he GUESSED that Atta, an Islamic 9/11 hijacker HAD been to Prague before, right? Why would he ASSUME THAT? The chances that an Islamic hijacker would visit Prague is probably pretty low.

A: There is no way he would assume that; he MUST HAVE SEEN Atta in Prague at that time. So if he saw him, why would he lie about Atta seeing the IIS chief?

As for the dates, maybe the guy was off by a week or two. He didn't tell the Czechs until AFTER he saw Atta's picture on TV after 9/11, it's easy to be off by a week or so. He's NOT an officer, he's an "asset" (informant of some kind); I'm sure he doesn't have training to remember like an officer would.

Has anyone interviewed him subsequently? His testimony seems to be dismissed out of hand, but again: how could the informant HAVE POSSIBLY KNOWN Atta was in Prague and told the Czechs he saw him meet al-Ani (the IIS CHief) UNLESS HE SAW HIM THERE? In April, Atta was unknown EVEN TO THE CZECHS. How could the informant have known Atta was in Prague previously? Not possible.

Saddam was secular/AQ religious

I have heard many times that it's "not possible" for Saddam/AQ to work together, since Saddam was secular (Baathist Party is the Socialist Party), and Al Queda is religious. Why would the 2 work together, they are "natural enemies".

Baathist leader and religious terrorist organization are "natural enemies"?

Then explain Assad of Syria working with Hezbollah.

Assad, the Syrian dictator, is also a Baathist, the SAME PARTY as Saddam.

And Hezbollah is an ISLAMIC terrorist organization.

And they seem to work together JUST FINE, especially in Lebanon. After all, the US allied with STALIN during WWII, and even with Iraq in the 80's against Iran.

Why is it impossible or even improbable for Saddam/AQ to work together when Assad/Hezbollah have worked together for years, perhaps decades (with Assad's father)? A: it's not impossible, Saddam would have worked with ANYONE to further his own ends, as would Al Queda.

In conclusion, this Phase II Senate Report was poorly done: the analysis that Saddam had NO ties to AQ, NO WMD, and basically contradicting ALMOST ALL pre-War intel, is FOCUSED ON.

ISG reports that there were no WMD stockpiles found: FOCUSED ON.

Documentation that SHOWS Saddam's WILLINGNESS and INTENT to rebuild WMD stockpiles after sanctions: glossed over.

Saddam's multiple meetings with Al Queda, in Sudan, AND BAGHDAD, as late as 1998: glossed over.

al Zarqawi in Baghdad for MONTHS w/o getting caught by the IIS: glossed over.

Salman Pak training of terrorists in explosives and "foreign operations": glossed over.

Iraq training AQ in chemical/bio weapons: recantation accepted as fact.

Iraq/AQ are "enemies": testimony of Saddam, Aziz, and al Tikriti believed w/o question.

The following document, which was not in the 2004 report: GLOSSED OVER:

"(U) A captured document states that bin Ladin asked Hijazi in the 1995meeting to dedicate targeted broadcasting of sermons by Shaikh Sulayman al-Udah and to conduct joint operations against foreign forces in Saudi Arabia.""The document does notindicate that Saddam agreed to joint operations with bin Ladin, but notes thatSaddam "agreed to dedicate programs for targeted broadcasting." The documentalso states that "through dialogue and agreements we will leave the door open tofurther develop the relationship and cooperation between both sides. '3 192

That, my friends, is the Loud Crickets version of the Senate Report. If you have any comments/suggestions/whatever, feel free to post here.